در این مقاله، ابتدا مساله ترافیک را از دیدگاه هندسه فینسلر بررسی کرده و نشان می دهیم که متریک وابسته به آن یک متریک فینسلر از نوع راندرزی است. بنابراین، مسیرهای بهینه زمانی برای مساله ترافیک، ژئودزیک های این متریک راندرز هستند، یک مثال واقعی با استفاده از برنامه میپل ارایه می کنیم، سپس یکی از روش های حل مساله تعادل ترافیک کاربر را که به حل یک مساله تکمیلی غیرخطی منجر می شود، بررسی و نشان می دهیم که یک متریک راندرز شرایط تابع فاصله برای حل این مساله را دارد. این مساله تکمیلی غیرخطی برای یک سیستم پویا تعمیم داده شده است. از نتایج حاصل می توان در مسایل مختلف تعادل استفاده کرد.

Non-cooperative intelligent control agents (ICAs) with dedicated cost functions, can lead the system to poor performance and in some cases, closed-loop instability. A robust solution to this challenge is to place the ICAs at the feedback Nash EQUILIBRIUM point (FNEP) of the differential game between them. This paper introduces the designation of a robust decentralized infinite horizon LQR control system based on the FNEP for a linear time-invariant system. For this purpose, two control strategies are defined. The first one is a centralized infinite horizon LQR (CIHLQR) PROBLEM (i.e. a supervisory PROBLEM), and the second one is a decentralized control PROBLEM (i.e. an infinite horizon linear-quadratic differential game). Then, while examining the optimal solution of each of the above strategies on the performance of the other, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the equivalence of the two PROBLEMs are presented. In the absence of the conditions, by using the least-squares error criterion, an approximated CIHLQR controller is presented. It is shown that the theorems could be extended from a two-agent control system to a multi-agent system. Finally, the results are evaluated using the simulation results of a Two-Area non-reheat power system.

The PROBLEM of personal identity among others may stem from the following question—what does be the person that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist of? The diachronic PROBLEM of personal identity raises question on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the person over time. The synchronic PROBLEM is grounded in the question of what features or traits characterize a given person at one time. To answer these questions, John Locke discarded the soul and the body as necessary and sufficient substances for personal identity over time. He accepted consciousness as the only criterion for personal identity; the only thing capable of remaining the same and preserving personal identity through change. Though Locke’s argument is somewhat clear and coherent but what remains vague and incoherent is embedded in the question—what exactly is consciousness? How and why should it be the basis or criterion for the determination of personal identity? Using the method of critical analysis, I argue that Locke’s choice of consciousness as the determinant of personal identity, though quite novel, is incoherent and vague. Secondly, Locke had already presumed and anticipated clearly though fallaciously the very thing he wishes to substantiate. I therefore conclude that Locke’s argument is just another way of trying to escape but inadvertently prolonging the difficulty of apparently articulating a distinction between the psychological approach and physiological approach to the PROBLEM of personal identity. However, in my submission, I propose the concept of the “other” as alternative approach— a sort of an extrinsic-intrinsic approach to the PROBLEM of personal identity.